Skip to content
Please update to the latest release 0.77.3 to address Multiple CVEs.
MacOS.Events.InfostealerExec
Edit this artifact

MacOS.Events.InfostealerExec

Streams process executions from Apple’s Endpoint Security (eslogger exec) and alerts on the command-line steps of macOS infostealers (AMOS/Atomic, Poseidon, Banshee, Cthulhu):

  • KeychainSafeStorageRead: security find-generic-password … -s "Chrome Safe Storage" (or Brave/Edge/Opera/Arc). Browsers read this key through the Keychain API, never the security CLI, so any match is suspicious regardless of caller.
  • KeychainDump / KeychainExport: security dump-keychain, or security export of a keychain.
  • OsascriptPasswordPrompt: osascript with a hidden-answer or password dialog — the fake “System Preferences needs your password” lure.
  • DsclAuthonly: dscl . -authonly — how stealers validate the phished password before using it.
  • CurlFileUpload: curl posting a file from a temp location or a zip.
  • DittoArchive: ditto -c -k, used to zip the staging folder.

Rules match on the target executable path and the joined argument list. Developer tools read the keychain constantly through the security CLI (for example Claude Code with -s "Claude Code-credentials" and GitHub CLI with -s gh:github.com, roughly 850 times a day on one test machine); these do not fire because the discriminator is the service name, not the caller. Do not allowlist by caller: a stealer can run security from any shell. Rules are a CSV parameter and can be tuned without editing VQL.

This covers the credential-access and exfil stage. Pair it with MacOS.UnifiedLogHunter’s “Browser Safe Storage Keychain Prompt” filter (select it with FilterRegex, for example Safe Storage) for hosts that were not running this monitor beforehand: securityd logs the requesting binary for Safe Storage prompts, including Keychain API callers that never run the security CLI.

Requirements

  • macOS 13+ (/usr/bin/eslogger), root, and Full Disk Access for the Velociraptor binary (granted via MDM PPPC); without FDA eslogger exits with “Not permitted to create an ES Client” — logged as an error.
  • Shells out (EXECVE permission).

Performance

eslogger emits every exec on the host as large JSON lines. Lines are pre-filtered with a cheap string regex (PrefilterRegex) before JSON parsing; only lines mentioning a watched binary are parsed. Note that eslogger JSON escapes forward slashes (\/usr\/bin\/security), which the default prefilter accounts for.

Testing

Validated on macOS 27 against a harmless AMOS-style simulation: an auto-dismissing hidden-answer dialog, dscl -authonly against a nonexistent user, a Safe Storage read denied at the keychain prompt, dump-keychain with output discarded, a ditto zip of fake files, and a curl upload to a closed local port. All six steps fired; a routine keychain read in the same run did not.


name: MacOS.Events.InfostealerExec
description: |
  Streams process executions from Apple's Endpoint Security (`eslogger exec`)
  and alerts on the command-line steps of macOS infostealers (AMOS/Atomic,
  Poseidon, Banshee, Cthulhu):

  - **KeychainSafeStorageRead**: `security find-generic-password … -s "Chrome
    Safe Storage"` (or Brave/Edge/Opera/Arc). Browsers read this key through
    the Keychain API, never the `security` CLI, so any match is suspicious
    regardless of caller.
  - **KeychainDump / KeychainExport**: `security dump-keychain`, or
    `security export` of a keychain.
  - **OsascriptPasswordPrompt**: `osascript` with a hidden-answer or password
    dialog — the fake "System Preferences needs your password" lure.
  - **DsclAuthonly**: `dscl . -authonly` — how stealers validate the phished
    password before using it.
  - **CurlFileUpload**: `curl` posting a file from a temp location or a zip.
  - **DittoArchive**: `ditto -c -k`, used to zip the staging folder.

  Rules match on the target executable path and the joined argument list.
  Developer tools read the keychain constantly through the `security` CLI
  (for example Claude Code with `-s "Claude Code-credentials"` and GitHub
  CLI with `-s gh:github.com`, roughly 850 times a day on one test machine);
  these do not fire because the discriminator is the service name, not the
  caller. Do not allowlist by caller: a stealer can run `security` from any
  shell. Rules are a CSV parameter and can be tuned without editing VQL.

  This covers the credential-access and exfil stage. Pair it with
  `MacOS.UnifiedLogHunter`'s "Browser Safe Storage Keychain Prompt" filter
  (select it with `FilterRegex`, for example `Safe Storage`) for hosts that
  were not running this monitor beforehand: `securityd` logs the
  requesting binary for Safe Storage prompts, including Keychain API callers
  that never run the `security` CLI.

  #### Requirements
  - macOS 13+ (`/usr/bin/eslogger`), root, and **Full Disk Access** for the
    Velociraptor binary (granted via MDM PPPC); without FDA `eslogger` exits
    with "Not permitted to create an ES Client" — logged as an error.
  - Shells out (EXECVE permission).

  #### Performance
  `eslogger` emits every exec on the host as large JSON lines. Lines are
  pre-filtered with a cheap string regex (`PrefilterRegex`) before JSON
  parsing; only lines mentioning a watched binary are parsed. Note that
  `eslogger` JSON escapes forward slashes (`\/usr\/bin\/security`), which
  the default prefilter accounts for.

  #### Testing
  Validated on macOS 27 against a harmless AMOS-style simulation: an
  auto-dismissing hidden-answer dialog, `dscl -authonly` against a
  nonexistent user, a Safe Storage read denied at the keychain prompt,
  `dump-keychain` with output discarded, a `ditto` zip of fake files, and a
  `curl` upload to a closed local port. All six steps fired; a routine
  keychain read in the same run did not.

reference:
  - https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity

author: liteman

type: CLIENT_EVENT

precondition: SELECT OS FROM info() WHERE OS = 'darwin'

required_permissions:
  - EXECVE

parameters:
  - name: PrefilterRegex
    description: Raw-line regex applied before JSON parsing. Must cover every ExecutableRegex below. Tolerates JSON-escaped slashes (\/).
    default: bin\\?/(security|osascript|dscl|curl|ditto)"
  - name: Rules
    type: csv
    description: First matching rule wins. ExecutableRegex matches the exec target path; ArgsRegex matches the space-joined argv.
    default: |
      Name,ExecutableRegex,ArgsRegex
      KeychainSafeStorageRead,^/usr/bin/security$,(?i)find-(generic|internet)-password.*Safe Storage
      KeychainDump,^/usr/bin/security$,dump-keychain
      KeychainExport,^/usr/bin/security$,(?i)\bexport\b.*keychain
      OsascriptPasswordPrompt,^/usr/bin/osascript$,(?i)(hidden answer|password)
      DsclAuthonly,^/usr/bin/dscl$,(?i)-authonly
      CurlFileUpload,^/usr/bin/curl$,(?i)(\s-F|--form|\s-T|--upload-file|--data-binary)\s+\S*(/tmp/|/var/folders/|\.zip)
      DittoArchive,^/usr/bin/ditto$,\s-c\b.*\s-k\b|\s-k\b.*\s-c\b

sources:
  - query: |
      LET stream = SELECT Stdout,
                          Stderr
        FROM execve(argv=["/usr/bin/eslogger", "exec"], sep="\n", length=10000000)
      
      -- eslogger errors (e.g. missing Full Disk Access) arrive on Stderr;
      -- surface them loudly instead of silently producing no rows.
      LET candidates = SELECT parse_json(data=Stdout) AS E
        FROM stream
        WHERE if(condition=Stderr,
                 then=log(message="eslogger: %v", args=Stderr, level="ERROR")
                  AND FALSE,
                 else=Stdout =~ PrefilterRegex)
      
      LET execs = SELECT E,
                         E.event.exec.target.executable.path AS Exe,
                         join(array=E.event.exec.args, sep=" ") AS CommandLine
        FROM candidates
      
      SELECT *
      FROM foreach(row=execs,
                   query={
          SELECT E.time AS Time,
                 Name AS Rule,
                 Exe,
                 CommandLine,
                 E.event.exec.target.audit_token.pid AS Pid,
                 E.process.executable.path AS Caller,
                 E.process.signing_id AS CallerSigningId,
                 E.process.team_id AS CallerTeamId,
                 E.process.ppid AS CallerPpid,
                 E.process.audit_token.euid AS Uid
          FROM Rules
          WHERE Exe =~ ExecutableRegex
           AND CommandLine =~ ArgsRegex
          LIMIT 1
        })````